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Abstract
Recent progress in machine learning techniques have re-
vived interest in building artificial general intelligence using
these particular tools. There has been a tremendous success
in applying them for narrow intellectual tasks such as pat-
tern recognition, natural language processing and playing Go.
The latter application vastly outperforms the strongest human
player in recent years. However, these tasks are formalized
by people in such ways that it has become ”easy” for auto-
mated recipes to find better solutions than humans do. In the
sense of John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, the com-
puter playing Go does not actually understand anything from
the game (Linhares and Chada 2013). Thinking like a human
mind requires to go beyond the curve fitting paradigm of cur-
rent systems. There is a fundamental limit to what they can
achieve currently as only very specific problem formalization
can increase their performances in particular tasks. In this pa-
per, we argue than one of the most important aspects of the
human mind is its capacity for logical thinking, which gives
rise to many intellectual expressions that differentiate us from
animal brains. We propose to model the emergence of logical
thinking based on Piaget’s theory of cognitive development.
Introduction
There is much debate about whether mathematics is discov-
ered or invented. The Platonic view is that mathematical ob-
jects exist in a reality separate and independent of ours, with
truths we are only discovering. Mathematical truths, e.g. the
fact that there is no largest prime number, are independent of
ourselves or the existence of the physical universe. We have
only found a way to prove it, but the ”truth is out there”,
whether we find a proof or not.
This view is best illustrated in a science fiction novel Con-
tact by Carl Sagan (1985). Alien intelligence hides mean-
ingful messages in the expansion of pi, the transcendental
number that is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its
diameter. The premise of this plot element is that the number
pi is mind-independent, so any intelligence, no matter what
form it takes, will be able to find this pattern and decode the
message.
The invention camp is based on the idea that mathemat-
ics is a cognitive construct, and mathematical objects and
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theorems reveal as much about our cognitive operations as
about the external world. This view is best illustrated by the
following long quotation from Jean Piaget:
“It is agreed that logical and mathematical structures
are abstract, whereas physical knowledge - the knowl-
edge based on experience in general - is concrete. But
let us ask what logical and mathematical knowledge is
abstracted from. There are two possibilities. The first
is that, when we act upon an object, our knowledge is
derived from the object itself. This is the point of view
of empiricism in general, and it is valid in the case of
experimental or empirical knowledge for the most part.
But there is a second possibility: when we are acting
upon an object, we can also take into account the ac-
tion itself, or operation if you will, since the transfor-
mation can be carried out mentally. In this hypothesis
the abstraction is drawn not from the object that is acted
upon, but from the action itself. It seems to me that this
is the basis of logical and mathematical abstraction. In
cases involving the physical world the abstraction is ab-
straction from the objects themselves. A child, for in-
stance, can heft objects in his hands and realize that
they have different weights — that usually big things
weigh more than little ones, but that sometimes little
things weigh more than big ones. All this he finds out
experientially, and his knowledge is abstracted from the
objects themselves. But I should like to give an exam-
ple, just as primitive as that one, in which knowledge
is abstracted from actions, from the coordination of ac-
tions, and not from objects. This example, one we have
studied quite thoroughly with many children, was first
suggested to me by a mathematician friend who quoted
it as the point of departure of his interest in mathemat-
ics. When he was a small child, he was counting peb-
bles one day; he lined them up in a row, counted them
from left to right, and got ten. Then, just for fun, he
counted them from right to left to see what number he
would get, and was astonished that he got ten again.
He put the pebbles in a circle and counted them, and
once again there were ten. He went around the circle in
the other way and got ten again. And no matter how he
put the pebbles down, when he counted them, the num-
ber came to ten. He discovered here what is known in
mathematics as commutativity, that is, the sum is inde-
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pendent of the order. But how did he discover this? Is
this commutativity a property of the pebbles? It is true
that the pebbles, as it were, let him arrange them in var-
ious ways; he could not have done the same thing with
drops of water. So in this sense there was a physical
aspect to his knowledge. But the order was not in the
pebbles; it was he, the subject, who put the pebbles in
a line and then in a circle. Moreover, the sum was not
in the pebbles themselves; it was he who united them.
The knowledge that this future mathematician discov-
ered that day was drawn, then, not from the physical
properties of the pebbles, but from the actions that he
carried out on the pebbles. This knowledge is what I
call logical mathematical knowledge and not physical
knowledge. The first type of abstraction from objects I
shall refer to as simple abstraction, but the second type
I shall call reflective abstraction, using this term in a
double sense.” (Piaget 1971b)
(See also (Dehaene 1999; Indurkhya 2016; Lakatos 1976;
Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez 2000; MacLane 1986; Piaget 1971a).)
The history of mathematics shows that it is both inspired
by natural observations as well as abstract thoughts with no
natural correspondence, at least not obvious ones. It is there-
fore limiting to choose one or the other point of view. Math-
ematics is both discovered and invented. However, the more
abstract a branch of mathematics (or any science relying on
a mathematical language) the less obvious it becomes where
to draw the line between invention and discovery.
Looking at mathematics as a human enterprise it becomes
clear that it is part of a larger effort of the human mind to
understand itself and the world we live in. Rather than de-
scribing nature by just enumerating observed objects, a more
efficient and effective way is to work with similarities, to
observe repeating patterns, to extract invariances. One ob-
served aspect of nature is that it is, to some extent, decom-
posable in smaller elements which have greater predictive
power and generalization capabilities than just lists of ob-
jects. It is exactly this capability of the human mind to ob-
serve these patterns and regularities as well as the power to
take them in the abstract and operate with them which gives
rise to the mathematical science. Mathematics is rigorous
and strict, a type of formalized and constrained philosophy.
It can be seen as an applied branch of philosophy. One could
complete, by analogy, the idea of fields arranged by purity
(Munroe 2008) - illustrated below - and state that ultimately
philosophy is just applied human intellect.
A rather amusing remark is the fact that for the large ma-
jority of Wikipedia’s articles by following the first link of the
main text and then repeating the process for subsequent arti-
cles leads eventually to the philosophy article (Xefer 2011).
Given the above statement it is only natural for this effect to
emerge.
In the light of the above view of the mind, the dilemma
often raised in the philosophy of mathematics seem to be a
dualistic view which ignores the fact that the human mind is
what does the revealing of the mathematical truths - either
invented or discovered. It is the human creativity, the abil-
ity to infer, reason and argue that lead to those truths. It is
therefore more constructive and enlightening to answer an-
other question: where do these abilities of the human mind
come from, are they something learned from experiencing
the natural world or are they something innate? Paul Er-
dos, metaphorically, spoke of ”The Book” where God wrote
the most elegant proofs of mathematical theorems. Some go
even further and invoke literal divine inspiration - the pos-
session of truth without proof - as in the case of Srinivasa
Ramanujan.
It it only reasonable to argue that the human mind is re-
sponsible for both inventions and discoveries, regardless of
the field in which it activates. Loosely speaking, invention is
the act of putting together concepts which were not associ-
ated before. It is a rather technical term and creativity seems
to be more broad and less restricted but denotes basically the
same idea. Creativity is the free association of any concepts
in any kind of form. It is not restricted by any means and
its free of any logical burden. Creativity is the essence of
art in its many forms stimulating all human senses. It is not
bounded by rigour and expresses countless feelings and car-
ries along human emotions and contradictions. On the other
hand discovery is a more restricted term, it carries rigour
and validity, it requires observation, inference, consistency
and most of the tools usually attributed to the left side of the
brain and it is mostly used in the natural sciences.
In mathematics, invention and discovery go hand in hand
and do not exclude one another, quite the contrary. A sim-
ple illustration would be the invention of algebraic equa-
tions and the subsequent realization that equations of the
type x2 = −1 are perfectly valid but which, because
of the properties of the multiplication operation, do not
make sense and therefore do not have any solution. Hu-
man creativity and thinking outside the box led to the in-
vention of complex numbers. In this case, the act of defin-
ing complex numbers follows the exact definition of the
word invention. The realization that equations of the pre-
vious form exist follows the exact definition of discovery.
It is evident how an abstract invention lead to a discov-
ery which lead to another invention which in turn lead to
other discoveries and so on. (See, for instance, (Knuth 1974;
Wallace 2010).)
Mathematics can be viewed as creativity under the super-
vision of logic. It is an interplay between the boundless ex-
pansion of creativity and the careful restrictions of rigour,
consistency and logic. We can associate together any two or
more concepts, but logic will carefully analyze if they can
actually live together and not exclude each other. The sim-
ple liar’s paradox is an example of such seemingly simple
association of concepts which, after a careful analysis, leads
to an impossibility.
In this context, one can distill two distinct aspects of the
mind which come into play: logic and creativity. Some gen-
eral remarks on creativity and logic as emergent aspects of
the brain are that:
• logic appear to be a universal property of healthy brains
• logic seems to be common between healthy brains
• logic is universal to any mind
• creativity is also a property of minds
• creativity is as diverse as there are people in the world
• mathematics is creativity and logic
• mathematics seems to be applicable to nature (Wigner
1960)
Another aspect of the mind which people often use when
confronted with insufficiently known situations is intuition.
It could be seen in some cases as an insufficiently argued
decision process, a guessed, consciously unexplained solu-
tion. It is famous for being both extraordinarily useful and
correct as well as being the complete opposite. Experience
and intuition are strongly linked, the first being, in fact, the
source of the latter. It is therefore used as a tool, together
with creativity and logic, in the natural sciences, physics in
particular being overly abundant in examples of both good
and bad intuitions.
The most recent and also most notorious example is the
early 20th century physics with the very bizarre aspects of
quantum mechanics. Intuition breaks down and, in some
artistic sense, human creativity seems to be surpassed by na-
ture’s creativity. The only pillar that is not affected by sub-
atomic physics discoveries is logic, although the validity of
this statement was debated during the 70s and 80s (Putnam
1969) starting from the claim that some basic logical state-
ments are not valid at the level of quantum mechanics and
perhaps logic itself should be changed to accommodate the
”real rules”. Recent analyses debate logic in the context of
how to interpret quantum mechanics itself but this extends
into metaphysics and shall not be of concern in this work.
Automated minds
If logic is empirical then it is most probably an emergent
property of the nervous system so it is foolish to try to ex-
plicitly program it, just like it turned out that human pro-
gramed rules and features do not stand up to the performance
of those discovered by neural networks through hands-on
experience. Two eloquent examples are:
• the explicitly programmed DeepBlue (Campbell, Hoane,
and Hsu 2002) vs. AlphaGo’s (Silver 2016) self play
• feature engineering in computer vision vs. current convo-
lutional neural networks
These are examples of a very particular application of
learning through experience but it hints towards the idea that
all knowledge available to an automated system should be
empirical and not explicitly programmed.
The previous argumentation suggests that a rough approx-
imation of the tools used by the human mind in the intellec-
tual endeavours are creativity, intuition and logic. There is
no definite separation as to which is used when, but it is
clear that there is a mixture of all of them. In the context
of artificial general intelligence, it is important to identify
these basic characteristics of an automated system in order
to assess its performance. Therefore a few tests would be
necessary to be developed as tools to investigate the status
of these sub-modules. Important traits of the human mind
for which test have to be developed can be summarized as:
pattern recognition, creativity, intuition and logic.
Pattern recognition is a field in which we generally started
to have some success and spectacular success in very partic-
ular domains. However we have just scratched the surface of
the domain, though, as many varieties of such tasks are still
below human capabilities.
It is important to understand thoroughly how pattern
recognition mechanisms work in the human brain and the
animal counterpart because there is a lot of common ground
between them. The creative, intuitive and logical cognitive
aspects of the brain are less evident in animals and to achieve
an artificial general intelligence one would argue that at least
these characteristics should be integral parts of any such in-
telligence as they qualitatively go beyond pattern recogni-
tion capabilities.
Logic is an emergent feature of the brain seen at a con-
scious cognitive level and endowing machines with our pre-
fabricated laws of logic would not be practical nor shine
much light on how the brain actually obtains them. The
great challenge in the exploration of the human intelligence
resides in the difficulty of the investigation tools. Trying
to understand how intelligence emerges from the brain via
bottom-up biology is like trying to understand how the bio-
logical structures emerge from the laws of quantum physics.
Conversely, trying to understand how intelligence emerges
from the brain via top-down cognitive science approach is
like trying to understand the laws of quantum physics start-
ing from the biological structures of the brain.
However difficult both of these approaches are, they are
the only ones we have and both shine some light into the
issue of intelligence. Biology hints towards the mechanism
while cognitive science guides the inquirer towards the cor-
rect landmarks which have to be achieved in order to ap-
proach a general intelligence.
(De)composability
The world seems to be compositional and procedural. Com-
positional because we observe that objects in nature are de-
composable into smaller objects. Procedural because most
things are the result of some process, a sequence of ac-
tions/events which lead to the creation of the object/event.
There is an apparent hierarchy in which objects at our scale
are composed of more elementary objects and other objects
can be obtained by combining several different objects at our
scale.
Decomposability is apparent in the fact that mountains
are made of large rocks gathered together in one place,
and rocks are made of smaller rocks glued together and so
on. Composability appears from the fact that smaller rocks
can be combined together into bricks which can be com-
bined together to make shelter. The world is a hierarchical
two-way structure on which we can go up and down. Does
this (de)composability induce the causal thinking paradigm?
Cause then seems to be the decomposition into sequentially
structured events which are the only sequence modelling the
process by which an event or object comes into being.
The decomposability of the world also leads to the idea
that stuff is made of smaller stuff. We observe this to be
true everywhere so we have this paradigm hardcoded into
our brains, or even worse: hardwired! Having this principle
at such a low level in our minds we always think of ask-
ing the question of what stuff is made of. What is this rock
made of? Smaller rocks. And the smaller rocks are made
of even smaller rocks and so on all the way down, end-
ing in the same place as the atomists. This naive view has
been revised and now we know that rocks are made of crys-
tals, made of atoms, made of electrons and nuclei, made of
protons and neutrons made of quarks and gluons made of
. . . nothing (yet). So in some sense we are in the same place
as the atomists but we like to wrap it up in more elaborate,
pretentious academic words.
But the question of what are the (...) made of still persists
because of our fundamental view of the world. The situa-
tion is so bad that we even start pondering the question of
what numbers are made of, in search of more elementary
constituents. Since numbers seem to be a made-up concept
of real observations the ridiculous of the situation shines
through when we realize that we ask the question of what
made-up stuff is made of. What are ideas made of? The ap-
proach of what is X made of seems to lead to an impasse.
Picturing this as a hierarchical structure one can realize that
there is no reason to believe there is a limit to its height while
the lower end seems at least ill defined. We should proba-
bly abandon this paradigm and accept that there is a level at
which everything has to stop.
Explanation and understanding
At a classical level where we do not decompose objects and
concepts indefinitely and go into metaphysical issues, from
a cognitive point of view we observe composability and de-
composability down to a certain level after which we do not
need to decompose things to explain them, we just observe
and experience them. It is impossible to learn the meaning
of words by reading their definition from a dictionary and
no amount of words and symbols could make us understand
the color red. Reading words about the color red does not
constitute an explanation and, in fact it is unexplainable, just
like many other objects, ideas, feelings etc. do not require
explanations but experimentation.
Objects, ideas, concepts, for which decomposition into
more elementary components is indeed possible are more
suitable to be understood in terms of explanations, un-
like elementary objects which require experimentation. It
appears, therefore, that explanation means decomposing a
new and yet unknown concept into more elementary con-
cepts (known to the agent that needs explanation) and un-
derstanding means making the connection between the al-
ready known elements and the new concept via the pro-
vided decomposition. This is the fundamental aspect of the
art of pedagogy, the explainers decomposition of a concept
into simpler concepts already known to the explainee. Re-
ceiving an explanation in terms of already known notions
would sometimes be followed by the exclamation: ”It makes
sense!”. In other words, it would be logical. It is therefore
apparent that logical statements are the ones which we al-
ready know to be true (because they have been previously
explained) or at least accept as being true due to them be-
ing inherently not decomposable into more elementary con-
stituents but just empirically true.
Decomposability, as discussed in the previous section, ap-
plies also to events and processes, not just to objects. Usually
events of major importance for us are the result of a sequence
of other events. Therefore understanding these sequences is
of great importance as well. They are so important, in fact,
that they build up the whole reasoning system and lead to
concepts of cause and effect. Causal explanations become
critical and surpass in importance dry facts exactly because
the universe that objectively and subjectively matters to us is
procedural and (de)composable, things happen in sequences
and the results are very much dependent on what exactly
happened and where. This is the reason why we remember
facts more easily when they are put in the context of a story,
a narrative, rather than being just enumerated. The logical
and causal component of the process of understanding is
gluing together facts in a more sturdy manner. It is there-
fore important to understand the process of understanding
itself, in both top-down and bottom-up approach as it will
shed some light on the emergence of logic.
Ladder of causation
The ladder of causation from ”The Book of Why” conceives
three qualitatively different levels of intelligence with the
first being representative for most animals and the current
ML and AI systems. (Pearl and Mackenzie 2018). Indeed ar-
tificial neural networks are finding patterns in data, whether
they’re annotated or not, whether they’re collected manually
or automatically, association is a tremendously successful
application.
The next two layers in the ladder of causation are based on
the question of ”what if...”. The second layer asks about the
future (”what if I do X?” and ”how can I make Y?”) while
the third is concerned about the past (”was X that caused Y?”
or ”what if I had done X instead of Y?”). Although the ques-
tions are arranged hierarchically, with the past being placed
at a higher level than the future it is easy to see that they
have something in common, namely they are both hypothet-
ical questions and are concerned with something that did not
happen and is only imagined to happen. Imagining possible
futures requires the same potential as imagining an alterna-
tive present.
We can formalize the causal investigation of a system by
using the following notation: St
do−→ A get−→ St+1. We chose
the state St as representing the known present, while the
multitude of possible actions A and the multiple possible
states St+1 lie in the future and are not known. In the con-
text of the intervention level we have two scenarios. In the
first we ask What if I do...?, case in which we know we want
to pick a certain action, a0, and we inquire about the par-
ticular state, say s0, it will lead us to. The second scenario
asks How can I make Y?, case in which we know the result
we want – state s0 – but we don’t know which particular
action to take. In both cases there are two knowns and one
unknown.
If we would now move the present to state St+1, put A
and St in the past we would have the same two possibilities
of asking the question of an alternative past state given a
specific action and present or the hypothetical present given
the past state and an alternative action.
From a cognitive point of view all the above scenarios are
similar in nature as they are asking about a hypothetical, al-
ternative state or action in the system. The only difference
between the two situation is that the future state can be ob-
served after an intervention while the hypothetical past or al-
ternative present can never be observed. However, once the
idea of a What if? arises it already means a level of intelli-
gence far beyond any pattern recognition machine. It can be
classified generally under imagination and creativity, since
both these concepts include the idea of something not being
there.
The impossibility of answering questions about alternate
past states or actions does not shine any light upon a present
issue in the absence of a model of the system. Once such a
model is present, it starts to bring the two past/future ques-
tions and hypotheticals even closer together. Suddenly an-
swers start to fit realistic situations and predictions start to
be accurate. The more accurate the model the more accu-
rate the answers. The scientific method is increasingly im-
proving the accuracies of such models applied to the natu-
ral world. This kind of investigations happen all the time in
physics, sometimes the intervention is called an experiment
and sometimes it’s called a thought experiment. In modern
times they are occasionally carried out in computer simu-
lations while in the past scientists like Galileo or Einstein
carried them out in their heads, using tools like creativity
and logic, the latter being the one judging the correctness of
the procedure, the ”gradient descent” of human reasoning.
Logic guides the inquirer of the ”what if” questions to-
wards the correct solution or towards the correct cause of
the inquired X or Y. In other words, logic is the fundamental
ingredient capable of successfully answer a particular ”what
if”, ”how” and ”why” question.
Unless we are capable of building a machine that can per-
form rudimentary reasoning based on a set of known facts,
the dream of achieving at least reliable and casualty free
driver-less cars will be eluding us. True artificial intelligence
will be one step above that. Artificial general intelligence
should be able to learn logical reasoning, not inherit it from
its creators.
Architecture
The recent resounding success of deep learning in various
domains have re-sparked the idea and hope that data-driven
methods like neural networks will be the key to achieving the
more ambitious goal of creating a general artificial intelli-
gence. However, current implementations of artificial neural
networks are confronted with several important issues lim-
iting their capabilities. One major issue with implementing
current artificial neural networks (ANN) in practical prob-
lems is their rather rigid structure. Networks used for clas-
sification tasks have usually fixed input and output sizes.
Their internal structure is empirically determined during the
training and design of the networks. Convolutional neural
networks (CNN), which most closely resemble the human
brain hierarchical organization, are chosen such that they
best solve the particular given task without clear arguments
and reasons as of why the obtained layers/nodes hierarchy
structure is optimal for the task. Some task require deeper
networks, some require shallower networks, and the optimal
network size and structure is found iteratively by the engi-
neers implementing the models. What these networks basi-
cally achieve is a decomposition of the input data into sim-
pler structures which, when presented with yet unseen data,
are still able to deliver the correct result within the limited
scope of the task. Sometimes this decomposition attempts to
split the input data into more elements than what is actually
needed, and therefore the performance is poorer compared
to a rougher decomposition.
Another major limitation of the current ANNs is that they
have great difficulties in handling long range correlations.
Some of them, like CNNs, are biased to only look for lo-
cal correlations and we will show in a future work that if
the data does not have this property, then they are not ca-
pable of producing relevant results. Multilayer perceptrons,
on the other hand, which are theoretically capable of finding
arbitrarily long correlations, are not computationally feasi-
ble and suffer from rigidity as well. Recurrent neural net-
works are capable of finding longer range correlations and
are not as rigid as other feed-forward networks with respect
to the input/output sizes but are still not able to tackle ar-
bitrarily long sequences. Deep reinforcement learning tech-
niques have tremendous problems in finding correct correla-
tions between relevant actions and relevant rewards, because
in most real world applications the distance between them is
generally larger than the correlation capabilities of the net-
works. Therefore, for some tasks the automated systems still
remain far behind the human counterpart.
For the human brain, from a cognitive perspective, one
can say that newly learned concepts are further used for
building other concepts, ideas, tasks, goals etc. ANNs do not
have the possibility to build upon newly acquired skills be-
cause of the inflexibility of allocating resources for new sit-
uations (and being, in fact, designed for only one particular
skill). Dynamic allocation of resources becomes critical. It
is not clear how to train a network if its structure is suddenly
enriched with a new layer or a few neurons in a layer and
still keep the already learned concepts or decompositions. It
is known that parts of the brain can take, to some degree, the
function of other parts, therefore an artificial network should
be capable of performing the same trick, without catastroph-
ically forgetting the previously acquired knowledge. We
therefore suggest that a more appropriate neural architec-
ture for either supervised or reinforcement learning should
be capable of allocating resources on demand and gradually
increase their usage as needed. Letting a neural network dy-
namically expand to find out by itself the depth/width nec-
essary to decompose certain objects/concepts into more el-
ementary constituents would most likely lead to finding a
compact architecture sufficiently complex to satisfactorily
complete the given task.
Experiments show that neural networks used in reinforce-
ment learning (RL) tasks are able to achieve good results
when starting from a lower difficulty and gradually increas-
ing it, rather than directly training on the most difficult task.
In a sense, gradual increasing of difficulty could be analo-
gous to continuous learning and hierarchical learning from
previously acquired skills and concepts. Training networks
by gradually increasing the difficulty of their task together
with allowing a dynamic growth and allocation of resources
would greatly enhance the results obtained from such sys-
tems.
One other issue with ANNs today is they are only good
at narrow pattern recognition tasks. Some applications, like
game playing, have limited success from using end-to-end
ML approaches. The recent trend is to employ multiple mod-
ules which can perform a narrow task very well and their
results are later combined in a predefined system to success-
fully complete a more complex task. Such a situation is, in
some sense, similar to the feature engineering used in earlier
versions of machine learning systems.
Current approaches use feature engineering not at the
level of data patterns but at the level of patterns in the en-
vironment mechanics. The dynamic of the world is decom-
posed by the engineers into more elementary action units
which, combined in various ways, achieve good results for
specific tasks. The logic of the world is separated and certain
algorithmic responsibilities are given to specialized mod-
ules. The burden of finding the problem’s logical solution
is taken by the engineer and the machine still solves just the
pattern recognition and curve fitting task. It becomes clear
that one important ingredient is not implemented in the ma-
chine yet and it is coming from the outside: logic. The capa-
bility of logical reasoning based on data and models is still
missing from current systems.
We will take a brief moment to illustrate the importance of
the four basic human traits we have considered in this work
– pattern recognition, creativity, intuition and logic – when
used properly in computer systems. One can argue in favour
of the AlphaZero (Silver et al. 2018) system that it some-
how successfully incorporated all these qualities of intelli-
gence. The system uses deep learning techniques to select
among the more promising future moves at a given board
position and these techniques incorporate pattern recogni-
tion. After selecting the promising candidates for the next
move, a Monte-Carlo tree search algorithm investigates the
implications of actually choosing one of the selected moves.
One can say that this is analogous to a logical process in the
human mind which narrows down the advantages of each
move. However, due to the large branching factor of the
game, one cannot be sure which of the moves is actually
the best: only a full map of the game tree could reveal that.
Considering that intuition is an insufficiently argued deci-
sion process, one can also argue that the selection of the
next move is driven by logic as well as intuition. Some pro-
fessional Go players stated that AlphaGo playing against
Lee Sedol, considered the strongest player of our time, has
demonstrated that is is capable of creative play. We will
leave this as an argument in favor of the claom that AlphaGo
and AlphaZero have already achieved creativity.
Despite being so successful, designing systems with built-
in logical capabilities is not desirable. This is because they
are limited to the domain they are designed for, and also be-
cause up to some level, regardless of which side of quantum
mechanics we are, logic has to be an emergent quality of the
brain. We therefore have to implement a system capable of
acquiring logic by itself.
The fundamental reason for the success of current ANN
is the geometrical approach to data transformation and the
back-propagation algorithm which depends on differentia-
bility of the network components: losses, activation func-
tion, convolution operations etc. But this differentiability
also constitutes a major impediment in many recent applica-
tions of ANN in reinforcement learning approaches because
many, if not most, of the real world tasks are not differen-
tiable. In fact the algorithmic world around us behaves more
like discrete mathematics. Investigating techniques which
go beyond the differentiability paradigm should be a ma-
jor topic dedicated to the development of neural networks or
newer systems.
Synthesis
We have investigated several aspects of intelligence put in
philosophical, cognitive, instrumental and causal contexts.
We have shown that in each context logic appears as either
an integral part or the essential aspect of intelligence, which
distinguishes the human brain from the animal brain.
We have argued that to go beyond current limited artificial
intelligence,logical reasoning is a crucial component of in-
telligence: it is fundamental to thinking at a lower level than
causal thinking, which is a manifestation of the logical part.
Logic is a fundamental aspect of all human philosophic
and scientific activities but, as much as it is used, described,
defined, taught and talked about, its emergence is not prop-
erly understood and investigated. It is exactly this aspect
which makes the difference between complex behaviour
with a purpose and meaning and one which is mere exis-
tential and motivated by survival. Being able to perform any
action and thought motivated by logical arguments proved
to be the source of the human success in understanding the
universe.
The questions of why something is logical, why logic
seems to be the same for everyone and why it has so much
success when used as a tool for understanding the world,
keep eluding us. Efforts for trying to uncover the source of
logic should be more focused and practically oriented. Real-
izing even the smallest logical thinking system without be-
ing explicitly programmed for that would be an even greater
revolution than ANNs are today, equivalent to the invention
of the wheel or the discovery of fire.
Modeling emergence of logical thinking
To model the emergence of logical thinking, we are essen-
tially taking a Piagetian approach, in which an agent starts
with preoperational thinking, proceeds to concrete opera-
tional thinking, and then advances to formal thinking (In-
helder and Piaget 1958). Though some of Piaget’s experi-
ments have been faulted for their design, and the interpreta-
tion of their results, we feel that this three-stage model still
provides a reasonable framework in which we can address
how logical structures emerge from sensori-motor interac-
tions. We are already applying this approach to model com-
puter programming as a cognitive process (Pert¸icas¸ and In-
durkhya 2018). We briefly describe here the three stages:
Preoperational thinking: This embodies the first step to-
wards consolidating the experiences based on sensori-
motor explorations. At this stage, symbolic representa-
tions emerge, but they are still grounded in static situa-
tions. Any transformations are egocentric, in that they are
focused on the actions of the agent itself.
Concrete operational thinking: At this stage, stable rep-
resentations and systems of transformations emerge: for
example, classifications, serial orders, correspondences.
These transformations become detached from static sit-
uations and become like internalized actions. They also
make the agent take a step from the actual to potential,
because internalized actions suggest potential outcomes
of a situation. This plays a key role in imagination.
Formal thinking: At this stage, the scope of potentialities
become wider so that the reality is considered to be mere
one of the possibilities. This corresponds to forming hy-
potheses and predicting the outcomes of actions.
In future work, we plan to elaborate this architecture. The
first step is to show how sensori-motor interactions can lead
to noticing regularities in the environment, which would
form the basis of preoperational thinking (Indurkhya 1992).
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